文章摘要
张宇航,倪明,孙永辉,等.针对网络攻击的配电网信息物理系统风险量化评估[J].电力系统自动化. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20190401003.
ZHANG Yuhang,NI Ming,SUN Yonghui, et al.Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber-physical System for Cyber-attacks in Distribution Network[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20190401003.
针对网络攻击的配电网信息物理系统风险量化评估
Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber-physical System for Cyber-attacks in Distribution Network
DOI:10.7500/AEPS20190401003
关键词: 风险评估  配电网信息物理系统  网络攻击  攻击图
KeyWords: Risk Assessment  Cyber-physical Power Distribution System  Cyber-attack  Attack Graph
上网日期:2019-08-13
基金项目:国家重点研发计划
作者单位E-mail
张宇航 国电南瑞科技股份有限公司 zhangyuhang0826@126.com 
倪明 国电南瑞科技股份有限公司 ni-ming@sgepri.sgcc.com.cn 
孙永辉 河海大学能源与电气学院 sunyonghui168@163.com 
李满礼 国电南瑞科技股份有限公司 limanli@sgepri.sgcc.com.cn 
摘要:
      现代物理电力系统的可靠和安全运行依赖于相关的信息系统,针对信息系统的网络攻击会导致严重的物理后果。为此,本文提出一种配电网信息物理系统(配电网CPS)网络攻击跨信息物理空间传递的风险量化评估方法。针对配电子站,根据IEC 61850标准建立三层信息模型,以断路器和分段开关为攻击目标,分析可能的攻击路径构造攻击图,提出基于相对熵(Kullback-Leibler距离)并结合逼近理想解排序法(TOPSIS)建立的KL-TOPSIS体系对信息系统脆弱性因子进行量化,结合马尔可夫链和深度优先算法综合计算攻击目标的攻击概率;并且,建立物理设备遭受网络攻击造成的物理后果指标,分别计算攻击各个断路器和分段开关的物理后果。结合物理后果和攻击概率,得到不同配电终端和配电子站的风险值。最后,以改进的配网算例验证了所提风险评估模型的有效性。
Abstract:
      Reliable and safe operation of modern physical power system depends on relevant information and communication technology (ICT) systems. Cyber-attacks against ICT systems can lead to serious physical consequences in power system. For this reason, this paper proposes a quantitative risk assessment method for cyber-attack on cyber-physical power distribution system across cyber and physical spaces. According to IEC 61850 standard, a three-tier cyber model is established for distribution substations. The possible attack paths are analyzed to construct attack maps. A KL-TOPSIS system based on relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler distance) and TOPSIS is proposed to quantify the vulnerability factors of cyber systems, and Markov chain and Depth-first algorithms are combined to synthetically calculate the attack probability of cyber-attack targets. Approaches for calculating the physical consequences after attacking circuit breaker and sectional switch are also established. Combining the physical consequences and attack probability, the cyber-attack risk values of different distribution terminals and substations are obtained. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed risk assessment model is verified by a modified IEEE distribution reliability test system.
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