文章摘要
王晛,张华君,张少华.风电和电动汽车组成虚拟电厂参与电力市场的博弈模型[J].电力系统自动化,2019,43(3):155-162. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180211004.
WANG Xian,ZHANG Huajun,ZHANG Shaohua.Game Model of Electricity Market Involving Virtual Power Plant Composed of Wind Power and Electric Vehicles[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2019,43(3):155-162. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180211004.
风电和电动汽车组成虚拟电厂参与电力市场的博弈模型
Game Model of Electricity Market Involving Virtual Power Plant Composed of Wind Power and Electric Vehicles
DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180211004
关键词: 电力市场  风电商  电动汽车聚合商  虚拟电厂  合作博弈  非合作博弈
KeyWords: electricity market  wind power producer  electric vehicle aggregator  virtual power plant  cooperative game  non-cooperative game
上网日期:2018-10-23
基金项目:
作者单位E-mail
王晛 上海大学机电工程与自动化学院, 上海市 200072  
张华君 上海大学机电工程与自动化学院, 上海市 200072  
张少华 上海大学机电工程与自动化学院, 上海市 200072 eeshzhang@staff.shu.edu.cn 
摘要:
      风电与电动汽车(EV)等储能装置联合运行,有助于缓解风电不确定性对电网带来的影响。为了研究风电商与EV聚合商以合作模式组成虚拟电厂(VPP)参与电力市场投标竞争对市场均衡结果的影响,基于寡头竞争的博弈均衡理论,分别建立风电商和EV聚合商以VPP合作模式参与投标竞争,以及以非合作模式独立参与投标竞争的电力市场多时段随机博弈均衡模型,采用场景生成与削减技术计入风速不确定性,并引入投标偏差惩罚机制。根据合作博弈理论,采用Shapley值法对VPP合作收益在风电商和EV聚合商之间进行分配。最后,算例分析验证了模型的合理性和有效性,并表明风电商和EV聚合商以VPP合作模式参与投标竞争时,能有效减少投标偏差,并能增加风电商和EV聚合商各自的利润,因而风电商和EV聚合商具有自愿组成VPP参与电力市场竞争的动机。
Abstract:
      Joint operation of wind power with electric vehicles (EVs) and other energy storage devices is helpful to alleviate the negative effects of wind power integration on power systems. To study the impacts of a virtual power plant (VPP) formed by wind power producer (WPP) and EV aggregator on electricity market equilibrium outcomes, based on oligopolistic game theory, two stochastic multi-period game equilibrium models of electricity market are proposed. One is for the case where a VPP is formed by WPP and EV aggregator and bids in the day-ahead electricity market, the other is for the case where the WPP and EV aggregator bid independently in a non-cooperative mode. In these models, the scenario generation and reduction technique is employed to deal with the uncertainty of wind speed, and a bid error penalty mechanism is taken into consideration. Secondly, the Shapley value method in cooperative game theory is applied to allocate the VPP profits between WPP and EV aggregator. Finally, numerical examples are presented to verify reasonableness and effectiveness of the proposed models. It is shown that the bid error will be lowered and both profits of WPP and EV aggregator will increase when WPP and EV aggregator bid in a VPP mode, which means that WPP and EV aggregator have incentives to voluntarily form a VPP to participate in the electricity market.
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