文章摘要
王剑晓,钟海旺,夏清,等.基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制设计[J].电力系统自动化,2019,43(2):7-17. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180410009.
WANG Jianxiao,ZHONG Haiwang,XIA Qing, et al.Competitive Mechanism Design in Electricity Market Based on Fair Benefit Allocation[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2019,43(2):7-17. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180410009.
基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制设计
Competitive Mechanism Design in Electricity Market Based on Fair Benefit Allocation
DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180410009
关键词: 价值公平分配  激励相容  边际价格  VCG机制
KeyWords: fair benefit allocation  incentive compatible  locational marginal price  Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)mechanism
上网日期:2018-11-19
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51777102,51537005);中国科协青年人才托举计划(YESS20170206)
作者单位E-mail
王剑晓 清华大学电机工程与应用电子技术系, 北京市 100084
电力系统及发电设备控制和仿真国家重点实验室(清华大学), 北京市 100084 
 
钟海旺 清华大学电机工程与应用电子技术系, 北京市 100084
电力系统及发电设备控制和仿真国家重点实验室(清华大学), 北京市 100084 
zhonghw@tsinghua.edu.cn 
夏清 清华大学电机工程与应用电子技术系, 北京市 100084
电力系统及发电设备控制和仿真国家重点实验室(清华大学), 北京市 100084 
 
汪洋 北京清能互联科技有限公司, 北京市 100084  
赖晓文 北京清能互联科技有限公司, 北京市 100084  
郭新志 国网河南省电力公司经济技术研究院, 河南省郑州市 450000  
摘要:
      有序推进电价机制改革,构建“公平、开放、有序、竞争、完整”的电力市场体系,是中国新一轮电力体制改革的关键任务。目前国外电力市场普遍采用边际价格出清的交易机制,然而理论与实践均证明,边际价格机制难以促进市场成员真实报价,难以解决电力系统信息不对称的难题。为促进市场成员理性报价、实现电力资源优化配置,提出一种基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制。首先,分析了边际价格难以保证发电机组真实报价、导致市场效率损失的现象和原因;进而,基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)机制设计理论,提出适应电力日前市场的价值公平分配机制,理论证明所提机制满足激励相容、个体理性以及系统成本最小化,并解释了该机制实现激励相容原理的经济学意义。基于IEEE 30节点和118节点系统的算例分析验证了该机制的有效性。
Abstract:
      Promoting the electricity price reform, and constructing a “fair, open, organized, competitive and complete” electricity market are critical tasks confronted by the new-round electric power system reform of China. At present, the foreign electricity markets generally adopt locational marginal prices(LMPs)for electricity market clearing. However, the existing theory and practice demonstrate that LMPs cannot incentivize market participants to be truth-telling, and cannot solve the problem of information asymmetry. To incentivize market participants to truthfully bid and thereby achieve an optimal allocation for electrical resources, a competitive mechanism in electricity markets is proposed based on fair benefit allocation. Firstly, the phenomenon and reason why the LMP mechanism cannot elicit truthful information while leading to market efficiency loss are analyzed. Then based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)theory, a fair benefit allocation mechanism is proposed for day-ahead electricity markets, and it is proved that the proposed mechanism satisfies the properties of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and system cost minimization. The economic meaning why the proposed mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility is also explained. Case studies based on IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems validate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
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